麻省理工學院「開放式課程網頁」 | 經濟學 | 14.74 2004秋季課程：發展政策的基礎理論

除了表中的閱讀作業外，下面列表中還有必讀與選讀的資料。
In addition to the table of reading assignments, please see the lists of required and suggested readings below.

課	主題／閱讀材料
1	緒論：貧窮的惡性循環 Introduction: The Vicious Circle of Poverty (a)世界發展報告 (a) World Development Report (b)《安靜的暴力：來自孟加拉農村的觀點》，12章，〈對一個貧窮鄉下家庭的實驗〉，哈特曼（1983） (b) A Quiet Violence: View from a Bangladesh Village Ch: 12, The Trials of a Poor Peasant Family: Hartmann (1983). 閱讀材料 Readings Hartmann，Betsy.〈對一個貧窮鄉下家庭的實驗〉。《安靜的暴力：來自孟加拉農村的觀點》，第12章，倫敦: Zed出版社, 1983. Hartmann, Betsy. "The Trials of a Poor Peasant Family." Chapter 12 in A Quiet Violence: View from a Bangladesh Village. London: Zed Press, 1983.
2-3	營養與生產力：相互關係 Nutrition and Productivity: Interrelationships (a) 理論模型；Ray，第272-279頁，第489-504頁。 (a) Theoretical model; Ray, pp. 272-279, 489-504. 營養不足導致生產力低下，生產力低下導致失業和低收入，收入低又造成了營養不足。這個理論模型可以運用到教育、健康、營養、性別和性別之間歧視和其他許多問題上。 Poor nutrition leads to low productivity. Low productivity leads to unemployment and low incomes. Low income leads to poor nutrition. This theoretical model can be applied to education, health, nutrition, gender and inter-generational discrimination, and many other issues. (b) 實證 (b) Empirical evidence i.從收入到營養； i. From income to nutrition: A.從收入到營養：印度Maharashtra省。.Subramanian和Deaton (1996). A. Income - Nutrition: A study of Maharashtra, India. Subramanian and Deaton (1996). B.讓老人得到貨幣使得兒童的營養水準提高。南非一項關於老年退休金的研究：Duflo (2003) B. Monetary transfer to the elderly can lead to better nutrition for the children. A study of old age pension in South Africa: Duflo (2003). ii. 從營養到收入； ii. From nutrition to income: A. Ray，第8章，特別是 8.3 與8.4小節。 A. Ray, chapter 8. In particular sections 8.3 and 8.4. 閱讀材料 Readings Ray，Debraj，《發展經濟學》，普林斯頓：普林斯頓出版社，1998。ISBN：0691017069。 Ray, Debraj. Development Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. ISBN: 0691017069. Subramanian, Shankar和Angus Deaton。〈對食物和熱量的需求〉，《政治經濟學報》104，第一期（1996）：第133-162頁。 Subramanian, Shankar, and Angus Deaton. "The Demand for Food and Calories." Journal of Political Economy 104, no. 1 (1996): 133–162. Duflo, Esther，〈祖母與孫女：南非年長者的養老金與家庭內的分配〉，《世界銀行經濟觀察》17，第一期（2005）：第1-25頁。 Duflo, Esther. "Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-age Pensions and Intrahousehold Allocation in South Africa." World Bank Economic Review 17, no. 1 (2003): 1–25.
4	健康 Health (a) 拉賈斯坦邦的健康狀況：Banerjee和Duflo (2003) (a) Health Status in Rajasthan: Banerjee and Duflo (2003). (b) 如果兒童沒有生病的話，他們更有可能去上學。肯亞一個非政府組織進行的試驗：Miguel和Kremer (2004) (b) Children are more likely to go to school if they are not sick. An experiment conducted by a NGO in Kenya: Miguel and Kremer (2004). 閱讀材料 Readings Banerjee, Abhijit V., Angus Deaton與Esther Duflo。〈在拉賈斯坦邦鄉下的財富，健康與保健事業〉，《美國經濟觀察》94，第二期（2004）：第326-330頁 Banerjee, Abhijit V., Angus Deaton, and Esther Duflo. "Wealth, Health and Health Services in Rural Rajasthan." American Economic Review 94, no. 2 (2004): 326-330. Miguel, Edward和Michael Kremer。〈蠕蟲：當前的治療現狀下對教育和健康的影響〉，《計量經濟學》72，第一期（2004）：第159-218頁 Miguel, Edward, and Michael Kremer. "Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities." Econometrica 72, no. 1 (2004): 159–218.
5-8	教育 Education (a) 印度基礎教育調查報告 (1999). (a) The Probe Report on Basic Education in India (1999). 印度教育機會；為什麼教育水準如此之低？家長重視教育嗎？家長能夠負擔起教育費用嗎？教育帶來的好處是什麼？ Educational choice in India: why are the levels of education so low? Do parents care about education? Can they afford it? What is education good for? (b) 教科書真的很重要嗎？肯亞一個非政府組織進行的試驗，Glewwe和Moulin (1998) (b) Are textbooks really important? An experiment conducted by an NGO in Kenya: Kremer, Glewwe and Moulin (1998). （c）一個在印尼有成效的學校建設項目例子：Duflo (2001) (c) An example of an effective program of school construction in Indonesia: Duflo (2001). 閱讀材料 Readings De, Anuradha和Jean Dreze等. 《印度基礎教育的公開報告》，牛津大學：牛津大學出版社，1999。ISBN：0195648706 De, Anuradha, and Jean Drèze, et. al. Public Report of Basic Education in India. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. ISBN: 0195648706. Kremer, Michael, Paul Glewwe和Sylvie Moulin。《教科書與測試成績：肯亞一項准評估的結論》，Mimeo，劍橋，麻省：哈佛大學，1998。 Kremer, Michael, Paul Glewwe, and Sylvie Moulin. "Textbooks and Test Scores: Evidence from a Prospective Evaluation in Kenya." Mimeo, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1998. Duflo, Esther。〈學校教育和勞動市場影響印尼建設：特殊政策實驗的證據〉，《美國經濟觀察》91，第四期（2001）：第795-813頁 Duflo, Esther. "Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment." American Economic Review 91, no. 4 (2001): 795–813.
9	童工經濟學 The Economics of Child Labor （a）為什麼童工會存在？什麼政策有助於消除這種現象？Basu和Van (1998) (a) Why does child labor exist? What policy can help to suppress it? Basu and Van (1998). （b）在巴西，收入對童工與入學錄取的影響：Carvalho (2000) (b) Income Effects on Child Labor and School Enrollment in Brazil: Carvalho (2000). 閱讀材料 Readings Basu, Kaushik和Pham Hoang Van。〈童工經濟學〉，《美國經濟觀察》88，第三期（1998）：第412-427頁 Basu, Kaushik, and Pham Hoang Van. "The Economics of Child Labor." American Economic Review 88, no. 3 (1998): 412–427. Carvalho, Irineu E。〈在巴西，家庭收入是入學錄取與童工的決定性因素：來自社會安全改革的證據〉（2000年11月30日） Carvalho, Irineu E., "Household Income as a Determinant of Child Labor and School Enrollment in Brazil: Evidence from a Social Security Reform" (November 30, 2000).
10-11	性別歧視 Gender Discrimination （a）印度性別歧視的證據：Dreze和Sen (1995) (a) Evidence of gender discrimination in India: Dreze and Sen (1995). （b）經濟原因可能導致性別歧視：Ray，第279-288頁 (b) Gender discrimination can arise due to economic reasons: Ray, pp. 279-288. （c）如何證實在日常生活中存在性別歧視？Deaton (1997) (c) How can we prove that there is gender discrimination in everyday life? Deaton (1997). （d）印度鄉下的消費平穩與過度的女性死亡率：Rose (1999) (d) Consumption Smoothing and Excess Female Mortality in Rural India: Rose (1999). (e) 「婚姻市場」：Rao (1993) (e) The "marriage market": Rao (1993). （f）資源不足導致「手足競爭」：Garg和Morduch (1998) (f) Resource constraints lead to 'Sibling Rivalry': Garg and Morduch (1998). 閱讀材料 Readings Dreze, Jean和Amartya Sen,〈性別不平等與女性機構〉，《印度：經濟發展與社會機會》第七章。德里：牛津大學出版社，1995，140-178。 Dreze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. "Gender Inequality and Women's Agency." Chapter 7 in India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 140–178. Ray, Debraj.《發展經濟學》。普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社，1998。ISBN：0691017069。 Ray, Debraj. Development Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. ISBN: 0691017069. Deaton, Angus.〈家庭調查分析〉，《世界銀行，國際銀行的重組與發展》，1997。 Deaton, Angus. The Analysis of Household Surveys. World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1997. Rose, Elaina.〈印度農村的消費平穩與過度的女性死亡率〉，《經濟學與統計學觀察》81，第一期（1999）：第41-49頁 Rose, Elaina. "Consumption Smoothing and Excess Female Mortality in Rural India." Review of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 1 (1999): 41–49. Rao, Vijayendra.〈丈夫身價提高：對印度農村嫁妝增加的樂觀分析〉，《政治經濟學報》101，第四期（1993）：第666-677頁 Rao, Vijayendra. "The Rising Price of Husbands: A Hedonic Analysis of Dowry Increases in Rural India." Journal of Political Economy 101, no. 4 (1993): 666–677. Garg, Ashish和Jonathan Morduch.〈手足之間的競爭與性別鴻溝：來自加納兒童健康結果的證據〉，《人口經濟學學報》11，第四期（1998）：第471-493頁 Garg, Ashish, and Jonathan Morduch. "Sibling rivalry and the gender gap: Evidence from child health outcomes in Ghana." Journal of Population Economics 11, no. 4 (1998): 471-493.
12-13	家庭內的交易 Bargaining within Families (a) 女人與男人消費的方式不一樣。來自巴西的證據（Thomas (1990)），聯合國兒童利益津貼（Lundberg, Pollak饑餓 Wales (1996)），南非養老金計畫（Duflo (2003)）。 (a) Income is not spent in the same way by women and by men: Evidence from Brazil (Thomas (1990)), the United Kingdom Child Benefit allowance (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1996)), a pension program in South Africa (Duflo (2003)). （b）家庭內的競爭不僅限於共用資源，也降低家庭所有成員的生產力和福利：Udry (1996). (b) Competition within the family is not limited to sharing the resources. It leads to lower productivity and lower welfare for all members in the family: Udry (1996). 閱讀材料 Readings Thomas, Duncan。〈家庭內的資源分配：一種推論性的方法〉，《人力資源學報》25，第四期（1990）：第635-664頁 Thomas, Duncan. "Intra-household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach." Journal of Human Resources25, no. 4 (1990): 635–664. Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert A. Pollak和Terence J. Wales。〈丈夫與妻子共用他們的資源嗎？來自聯合國兒童基金會的證據〉，《人力資源學報》32，第四期（1996）：第463-480頁 Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert A. Pollak, and Terence J. Wales. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit." Journal of Human Resources 32, no. 4 (1996): 463–480. Duflo, Esther。〈祖母與孫女：南非老年人的養老金與家庭內分配〉，《世界銀行經濟觀察》17，第一期（2003）：第1-25頁 Duflo, Esther. "Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-age Pensions and Intrahousehold Allocation in South Africa." World Bank Economic Review 17, no. 1 (2003): 1–25. Udry, Christopher.〈性別、農產品與家庭理論〉，《政治經濟學報》101，第五期（1996）：第1010-1045頁 Udry, Christopher. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and The Theory of the Household." Journal of Political Economy 101, no. 5 (1996): 1010–1045.
14	期中考試 Midterm
15	儲蓄 Savings （a）窮人會在經濟狀況好的時候，會考慮為以後可能出現的拮据而儲蓄嗎？泰國稻農的儲蓄：Paxson (1992)。 (a) Do poor people save in good times in anticipation of bad times? Savings by rice farmers in Thailand: Paxson (1992). （b）窮人能掌握儲蓄的方法嗎？墨西哥的小型儲蓄試驗：Aportela (1998) (b) Have poor people access to savings instruments: A micro-savings experiment in Mexico: Aportela (1998). 閱讀材料 Readings Paxson, Christina H。〈用天氣的易變性來估計在泰國儲蓄對短時間收入的影響〉，《美國經濟觀察》82，第一期（1992）：第15-33頁 Paxson, Christina H. "Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in Thailand." American Economic Review 82, no. 1 (1992): 15–33. Aportela, Fernando。〈低收入人群理財方式對其儲蓄的影響〉，在拉丁美洲和加勒比海經濟聯盟年度會議上的論文，Rio de Janeiro，Brazil，2000年10月 Aportela, Fernando. "The Effects of Financial Access on Savings by Low-Income People." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, October 2000.
16-17	土地 Land （a）理論背景：Ray，第12章。 (a) Theoretical background: Ray, chapter 12. （b）為什麼要土地改革？Banerjee (1999)。 (b) Why land reform? Banerjee (1999). （c）印度的一個成功的限制性的土地改革：Banerjee和Ghatak (2002) (c) A successful limited land reform in India: Banerjee and Ghatak (2002). 閱讀材料 Readings Ray, Debraj.《發展經濟學》，普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社，1998。ISBN：0691017069。 Ray, Debraj. Development Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. ISBN: 0691017069. Banerjee, Abhijit V。〈土地改革：前景與策略〉（1999年4月）。會議論文，年度世界銀行發展經濟會議，華盛頓；和麻省理工學院經濟學系研究論文No.99-24 Banerjee, Abhijit V., "Land Reforms: Prospects and Strategies" (April 1999). Conference Paper, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C.; and MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 99-24. Banerjee, Abhijit V.Paul Gertler和Maitreesh Ghatak〈授權與效率：孟加拉西部租賃改革〉，《政治經濟學報》110，第二期（2002）：第239-280頁 Banerjee, Abhijit V., Paul Gertler, and Maitreesh Ghatak. "Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal." Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 2 (2002): 239–280.
18-19	保險 Insurance 在一年之內，或從一年到另一年的農業收入波動都很大。消費與投資也一樣波動？還是家庭會免遭波動的影響？ Agricultural incomes fluctuate enormously during the year and from year to year. Do consumption and investments fluctuate as well, or are households protected from these fluctuations? （a）Ray，第15章。 (a) Ray, chapter 15. （b）保險僅僅是局部的：在Cote d'Ivoire家庭成員的消費是與他們的收入相聯繫的：Deaton (1997)，第372-383頁. (b) Insurance is only partial: the consumption of household members in Cote d'Ivoire is linked to their income: Deaton (1997), pp 372-383. （c）在經濟困難的時期，兒童會失學並挨餓嗎？來自Cote d'Ivoire的例子：Jensen (2000)。 (c) In bad times are children taken out of school, and given less to eat? An example from Cote d'Ivoire: Jensen (2000). （d）在西非，村民相互貸款並得到某種程度的保障：Udry (1990)。 (d) In West Africa, villagers lend to each other and achieve a certain degree of insurance: Udry (1990). （e）在人煙稀少的鄉村沒有這種公共保障，這依賴於地方制度的力量：Townsend (1995)。 (e) Mutual insurance in the village does not happen in the void. It depends on the strength of local institutions: Townsend (1995). 閱讀材料 Readings Ray, Debraj.《發展經濟學》，普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社，1998，ISBN：0691017069。 Ray, Debraj. Development Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. ISBN: 0691017069. Deaton, Angus.《家庭調查分析》，《華盛頓：世界銀行，國際重組與發展銀行》，1997。 Deaton, Angus. The Analysis of Household Surveys. Washington: World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1997. Jensen, Robert.〈農業的多變性與對兒童的投資〉，《美國經濟觀察》90，第二期（2000）：第399-405頁 Jensen, Robert. "Agricultural Volatility and Investments in Children." American Economic Review 90, no. 2 (2000): 399–405. Udry, Christopher.〈尼日利亞北部的信用市場：在農業經濟中拿信用作擔保〉，《世界銀行經濟觀察》4，第三期（1990）：第251-69頁 Udry, Christopher. "Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy." World Bank Economic Review 4, no. 3 (1990): 251–69. Townsend, Robert.〈泰國北部鄉村的金融體系〉，《經濟學季刊》 110，第四期（1995）：第1011-1046頁 Townsend, Robert. "Financial Systems in Northern Thai Villages." Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 4 (1995): 1011–1046.
20-21	信用市場 Credit Markets 為什麼窮人不能使用正規的信貸？為什麼政府有組織的貸款不起作用？為什麼窮人會向地方高利貸借錢？ Why does formal credit fail to reach the poor? Why has targeted lending organized by the government not worked? Why do the poor borrow from local money lenders at very high rates? （a）理論背景：Ray，第14章。 (a) Theoretical background: Ray, chapter 14. （b）為什麼非正規的貸方把利息抬得那麼高？Aleem (1990) (b) Why do informal money lenders charge interest rates that are so high? Aleem (1990). （c）貸款的創新形式：小型信用：Morduch (1999) (c) An innovative form of lending: micro-credit: Morduch (1999). 閱讀材料 Readings Ray, Debraj,《發展經濟學》，普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社，1998。ISBN：0691017069。 Ray, Debraj. Development Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. ISBN: 0691017069. Aleem, Irfan.〈不完美的資訊、審查與非正式貸款的成本：對巴基斯坦農村信用市場的研究〉，《世界銀行經濟觀察》3（1990）：第329-349頁 Aleem, Irfan. "Imperfect Information, Screening and The Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan." World Bank Economic Review 3 (1990): 329–349. Morduch, Jonathan.〈小型貸款承諾〉，《經濟文獻期刊》35，第四期（1999）：第1569-1614頁 Morduch, Jonathan. "The Microfinance Promise." Journal of Economic Literature 37, no. 4 (1999): 1569–1614.
22-24	正規與非正規的制度 Formal and Informal Institutions （a）社會網路 (a) Social networks 在無人區不會出現政策。非正規的制度和標準扮演了什麼角色？ No policy happens in the void.... What role do informal institutions and norms play? i. 標準有助於維持Maghribi商人間的遠距離貿易：Greif (1993) i. Norms helped to sustain long distance trade among Maghribi traders: Greif (1993). ii.然而，成功的非正規制度會成為正規制度發展的障礙：Greif (1994) ii. However, successful informal institution can be an obstacle to the development of formal institutions: Greif (1994). iii.社會規範對人口變遷的阻礙：Munshi (2000). iii. Social norms as an obstacle to the demographic transition: Munshi (2000). （b）正規的制度 (b) Formal Institutions i.全世界的制度大不相同：La Porta和Vishny (1998) i. Institutions differ widely around the world: La Porta and Vishny (1998). ii. 好的制度對於經濟效益很重要：聚合的方法：Acemoglu和Robinson (2001) ii. Good institutions are important for economic performance: aggregate approach: Acemoglu and Robinson (2001). iii.歷史的方法：在印度，殖民歷史依然影響著今天的成果：Banerjee和Iyer (2002)，Iyer (2003)。 iii. Historical approach: In India, colonial history continues to impact today's outcomes Banerjee and Iyer (2002), Iyer (2003). iv.制度為什麼重要。不良的制度環境可能給商業造成不好的影響。對印度的軟體市場契約和聲譽所做的研究：Banerjee和Duflo (2000) iv. The mechanics of why institutions matter. A poor institutional environment may makes business difficult. A study of contracting and reputation in the Indian Software industry: Banerjee and Duflo (2000). 閱讀材料 Readings Greif, Avner. 〈在早期貿易中契約的強迫性與經濟制度：Maghribi 的商人聯盟〉，《美國經濟觀察》83, 第三期(1993)：第525-548頁 Greif, Avner. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institution in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders Coalition." AER 83, no. 3 (1993): 525–548. ---〈文化信仰與社會組織：對集體主義社會與個體主義社會歷史與理論的反思〉，《政治經濟學報》102，第五期 (1994)：第912-950頁 ———. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 5 (1994): 912–950. Munshi, Kaivan.〈在變動時期社會制度與個體決策：對人口統計學變遷的應用〉， Mimeo，費城：賓夕法尼亞大學，2000 Munshi, Kaivan. "Social Norms and Individual Decisions During a Period of Change : An Application to the Demographic Transition." Mimeo, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2000. La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer和Robert Vishny。〈法律與金融〉，《政治經濟學報》106，第六期(1998)：第1113-1155頁 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. "Law and Finance." Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 6 (1998): 1113–1155. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson和James Robinson。〈比較發展的殖民起因：實證調查〉，《美國經濟觀察》91, 第五期(2001)：第1369-1401頁 Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401. Banerjee, Abhijit V.和Iyer, Lakshmi，〈歷史制度和經濟成果：印度殖民地佔有制的遺產〉（2002年6月）。麻省理工學院經濟學系研究論文，NO. 02-27 Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Iyer, Lakshmi, "History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India" (June 2002). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 02-27. Iyer, Lakshmi.〈殖民制度的長期影響：來自印度的證據〉，Mimeo，劍橋大學，麻省：麻省理工大學，2003。 Iyer, Lakshmi. "The Long-term Impact of Colonial Rule: Evidence from India." Mimeo, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2003. Banerjee, Abhijit V和Esther Duflo.〈聲譽的影響與契約的限制：印度軟體公司的研究〉，《經濟學季刊》115，第三期(2000): 第989-1017頁 Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry." Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 3 (2000): 989–1017.
25-26	社會福利政策的阻礙：貪污 Limits to Social Policy: Corruption （a）為什麼貪污的代價高？Shleifer和Vishny (1993) (a) Why is corruption costly? Shleifer and Vishny (1993). （b）為什麼貪污不合法？為什麼貪污和瑣碎手續並存？Banerjee (1997) (b) Why is corruption illegal? Why does corruption and red tape go hand in hand? Banerjee (1997). （c）貪污與社會政策的牽制：印度南部運河灌溉的例子：Wade (1982) (c) Corruption and the diversion of social policies. The example of canal irrigation in South India: Wade (1982). 閱讀材料 Readings Shleifer, Andrei和Robert W. Vishny.〈貪污〉，《經濟學季刊》（1993） Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. "Corruption."The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1993). Banerjee, Abhijit V.〈無效管理理論〉，《經濟學季刊》112，第四期(1997)：第1289-1332頁 Banerjee, Abhijit V. "A Theory of Misgovernance." Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no.4 (1997): 1289–1332. Wade, Robert.〈管理系統與政治貪污：南非運河灌溉〉，《發展研究學報》18，第三期 (1982)：第287-328頁 Wade, Robert. "The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India."Journal of Development Studies 18, no. 3 (1982): 287–328.

必要讀物
Required Readings

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, 和James Robinson 〈比較發展的殖民起因：實證調查〉，《美國經濟觀察》91，第五期(2001): 第1369-1401頁
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369-1401.

Aleem, Irfan.〈不完美的資訊、審查與非正式貸款的成本：對巴基斯坦鄉村信用市場的研究〉，《世界銀行經濟觀察》3 (1990)：第329-349頁
Aleem, Irfan. "Imperfect Information, Screening and The Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan." World Bank Economic Review 3 (1990): 329-349.

Banerjee, Abhijit V.〈土地改革：前景與策略〉（1999年4月）會議論文，年度世界銀行發展經濟會議，華盛頓；麻省理工學院經濟學系研究論文 No.99-24
Banerjee, Abhijit V., "Land Reforms: Prospects and Strategies" (April 1999). Conference Paper, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C.; and MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 99-24.

Banerjee, Abhijit V., Angus Deaton和Esther Duflo.〈在拉賈斯坦邦鄉下的財富，健康與保健事業〉，《美國經濟觀察》04，2004年第二期：第326-330頁
Banerjee, Abhijit V., Angus Deaton, and Esther Duflo. "Wealth, Health and Health Services in Rural Rajasthan." American Economic Review 94, no. 2 (2004): 326-330.

Dreze, Jean和Amartya Sen.〈性別不平等與女性機構〉，《印度：經濟發展與社會機會》第七章，德里：牛津大學出版社，1995，第140-178頁
Dreze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. "Gender Inequality and Women's Agency." Chapter 7 in India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 140-178.

Paxson, Christina H.〈用天氣的易變性來估計泰國的儲蓄對短期收入的影響〉，《美國經濟觀察》82，第一章(1992)：第15-33頁
Paxson, Christina H. "Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in Thailand." American Economic Review 82, no. 1 (1992): 15-33.

Probe Team .〈學校環境〉，《印度基礎教育的公開報告》，第四章，德里：牛津大學出版社，1999a.
Probe Team. "The School Environment." Chapter 4 in Public Report on Basic Education in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999a.

--- 〈學校與家庭〉，《印度基礎教育的公開報告》，第三章，德里：牛津大學出版社，1999b.
———. "Schooling and The Family." Chapter 3 in Public Report on Basic Education in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999b.

Udry, Christopher.〈尼日利亞北部信用市場：在農村經濟中用信用做擔保〉，《世界銀行經濟觀察》4，第三章 (1990)：第251-69頁
Udry, Christopher. "Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy." World Bank Economic Review 4, no. 3 (1990): 251-69.

--- 〈性別、農產品與家庭理論〉，《政治經濟學學報》101, 第五章(1996)：第1010-1045頁
———. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and The Theory of the Household." Journal of Political Economy 101, no. 5 (1996): 1010-1045.

Wade, Robert.〈管理體系與政治貪污：南非運河灌溉〉，《發展研究學報》18, 第三期 (1982)：第287-328頁
Wade, Robert. "The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India." Journal of Development Studies 18, no. 3 (1982): 287-328.

選讀讀物
Suggested Readings

Aportela, Fernando.〈低收入人群的理財方式對儲蓄的影響〉，拉丁美洲與加勒比海經濟組織年度會議論文，Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2000年10月
Aportela, Fernando. "The Effects of Financial Access on Savings by Low-Income People." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, October 2000.

Banerjee, Abhijit V. 〈無效管理理論〉，《經濟學季刊》112, 第四期(1997): 第1289-1332頁
Banerjee, Abhijit V. "A Theory of Misgovernance." Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (1997): 1289-1332.

Banerjee, Abhijit V.與Esther Duflo. 〈聲譽的作用與的限制：對印度軟體公司的研究〉，《經濟學季刊》 115, no. 3 (2000): 第989-1017頁
Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. "Reputation Effects and The Limits of Contracting: A Study of The Indian Software Industry." Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 3 (2000): 989-1017.

Banerjee, Abhijit V., Paul Gertler與Maitreesh Ghatak.〈授權與效率：孟加拉西部租賃改革〉，《政治經濟學學報》110， no. 2 (2002)：第239-280頁
Banerjee, Abhijit V., Paul Gertler, and Maitreesh Ghatak. "Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal." Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 2 (2002): 239-280.

Basu, Kaushik和Pham Hoang Van.〈童工經濟學〉，《美國經濟觀察》88, no. 3 (1998)：第412-427頁
Basu, Kaushik, and Pham Hoang Van. "The Economics of Child Labor." American Economic Review 88, no. 3 (1998): 412-427.

Carvalho, Irineu E. 〈在巴西，家庭收入對童工與入學錄取的決定性影響：來自一項社會安全改革的證據〉（2000年11月3日）
Carvalho, Irineu E., "Household Income as a Determinant of Child Labor and School Enrollment in Brazil: Evidence from a Social Security Reform" (November 30, 2000).

Deaton, Angus.〈家庭調查分析〉，《華盛頓：世界銀行，國際銀行重組與發展》，1997
Deaton, Angus. The Analysis of Household Surveys. Washington: World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1997.

Duflo, Esther. 〈學校教育和勞動市場影響印尼建設：特殊政策實驗的結論〉，《美國經濟觀察》91， no. 4 (2001)：第795-813頁
Duflo, Esther. "Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from An Unusual Policy Experiment." American Economic Review 91, no. 4 (2001): 795-813.

---〈祖母與孫女：南非老年人的養老金與家用的分配〉，《世界銀行經濟觀察》17，第一期（2005）：第1-25頁
———. "Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-age Pensions and Intrahousehold Allocation in South Africa." World Bank Economic Review 17, no. 1 (2003): 1-25.

Garg, Ashish和Jonathan Morduch.〈手足競爭與性別鴻溝：加納兒童健康結果的證據〉，《人口經濟學學報》 11，第四期（1998）：第471-493頁
Garg, Ashish, and Jonathan Morduch. "Sibling rivalry and the gender gap: Evidence from child health outcomes in Ghana." Journal of Population Economics 11, no. 4 (1998): 471-493.

Greif, Avner. 〈在早期貿易中契約的強迫性與經濟制度：Maghribi的商人聯盟〉，《美國經濟觀察》83, 第三期(1993)：第525-548頁
Greif, Avner. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institution in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders Coalition." American Economic Review 83, no. 3 (1993): 525-548.

---〈文化信仰與社會組織：對集體與個體主義社會的歷史與理論反思〉，《政治經濟學報》102，第五期 (1994)：第912-950頁
———. "Cultural Beliefs and The Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 5 (1994): 912-950.

Hartmann，Betsy.〈一個貧窮鄉下家庭的試驗〉，《安靜的暴力：來自孟加拉農村的觀點》，第12章。倫敦：Zed 出版社，1983。
Hartmann, Betsy. "The Trials of A Poor Peasant Family." Chapter 12 in A Quiet Violence: View from a Bangladesh Village. London: Zed Press, 1983.

Jensen, Robert.〈農業的多變性與對兒童的投資〉，《美國經濟觀察》90，第二期（2000）：第399-405頁
Jensen, Robert. "Agricultural Volatility and Investments in Children." American Economic Review 90, no. 2 (2000): 399-405.

Kremer, Michael, Paul Glewwe和Sylvie Moulin.〈教科書與測試成績：來自肯亞評估的結論〉，Mimeo，劍橋，麻省：哈佛大學，1998
Kremer, Michael, Paul Glewwe, and Sylvie Moulin. "Textbooks and Test Scores: Evidence from a Prospective Evaluation in Kenya." Mimeo, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1998.

Kremer, Michael, 與Edward Miguel.〈健康與上學：肯亞小學的除蟲計畫〉，德里，劍橋，麻省：牛津大學，1999
Kremer, Michael, and Edward Miguel. "Health and School Participation: The Primary School Deworming Project in Kenya." Mimeo, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1999.

La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer和Robert Vishny.〈法律與金融〉，《政治經濟學學報》106，no. 6 (1998)：第1113-1155頁
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. "Law and Finance." Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 6 (1998): 1113-1155.

Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert A. Pollak和Terence J. Wales。〈丈夫與妻子共用他們的資源嗎？來自聯合國兒童基金的證據〉，《人力資源學報》32，第四期（1996）：第463-480頁
Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert A. Pollak, and Terence J. Wales. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool their Resources? Evidence from The United Kingdom Child Benefit." Journal of Human Resources 32, no. 3 (1996): 463-480.

Morduch, Jonathan.〈小型貸款的承諾〉，《經濟文獻期刊》35，第四期（1999）：第1569-1614頁
Morduch, Jonathan. "The Microfinance Promise." Journal of Economic Literature 37, no. 4 (1999): 1569-1614.

Munshi, Kaivan。〈在變動時期社會的規章制度與個體決策：對人口統計學變遷的應用〉，Mimeo，費城：賓夕法尼亞大學，2000。
Munshi, Kaivan. "Social Norms and Individual Decisions During a Period of Change: An Application to The Demographic Transition." Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

Rao, Vijayendra.〈丈夫身價提高：對印度農村嫁妝增加的樂觀分析〉，101，第四期（1993）：第666-677頁
Rao, Vijayendra. "The Rising Price of Husbands: A Hedonic Analysis of Dowry Increases in Rural India." Journal of Political Economy 101, no. 4 (1993): 666-677.

Rose, Elaina.〈印度農村的消費平穩與過度的女性死亡率〉，《經濟學與統計學觀察》81，第一期（1999）：第41-49頁
Rose, Elaina. "Consumption Smoothing and Excess Female Mortality in Rural India." Review of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 1 (1999): 41-49.

Shleifer, Andrei和Robert W. Vishny.〈貪污〉，《經濟學季刊》（1993）。
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. "Corruption." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no. 3 (1993): 599-617.

Subramanian, Shankar和Angus Deaton.〈對食物和熱量的需求〉，《政治經濟學報》104，第一期（1996）：第133-162頁
Subramanian, Shankar, and Angus Deaton. "The Demand for Food and Calories." Journal of Political Economy 104, no. 1 (1996): 133-162.

Thomas, Duncan.〈家庭內的資源分配：一種推論性的方法〉，《人力資源學報》25，第四期（1990）：第635-664頁
Thomas, Duncan. "Intra-household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach." Journal of Human Resources 25, no. 4 (1990): 635-664.

Townsend, Robert.〈泰國北部鄉村的金融體系〉，《經濟學季刊》110，第四期（1995）：第1011-1046頁
Townsend, Robert. "Financial Systems in Northern Thai Villages." Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 4 (1995): 1011-1046.