| 1 |
緒論：貧窮的惡性循環
Introduction: The Vicious Circle of Poverty
(a)世界發展報告
(a) World Development Report
(b)《安靜的暴力：來自孟加拉農村的觀點》，第12章，〈對一個貧窮鄉下家庭的實驗〉，哈特曼（1983）
(b) A Quiet Violence: View from a Bangladesh Village Ch: 12, The Trials of a Poor Peasant Family: Hartmann (1983). |
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| 2-3 |
營養與生產力：相互關係
Nutrition and Productivity: Interrelationships
(a) 理論模型；Ray，第272-279頁，第489-504頁。
(a) Theoretical model Ray, pp. 272-279. Ray, pp. 489-504.
營養不足導致生產力低下，生產力低下導致失業和低收入，收入低又造成了營養不足。這個理論模型可以運用到教育、健康、營養、性別和性別之間歧視和其他許多問題上。
Poor nutrition leads to low productivity. Low productivity leads to unemployment and low incomes. Low income leads to poor nutrition. This theoretical model can be applied to education, health, nutrition, gender and inter-generational discrimination, and many other issues.
(b)實例
(b) Empirical evidence
i.從收入到營養；
(i) From income to nutrition:
A.收入－營養：印度Maharashtra省。Subramanian和Deaton (1996).
A. Income - Nutrition: A study of Maharashtra, India. Subramanian and Deaton (1996).
B.讓老人得到貨幣可以使得兒童的營養水準提高。南非一項關於老年退休金的研究：Duflo (2003)
B. Monetary transfer to the elderly can lead to better nutrition for the children. A study of old age pension in South Africa: Duflo (2003)
ii. 從營養到收入；
(ii) From nutrition to income:
A.Ray，第8章，特別是 8.3 與8.4小節。
A. Ray, chapter 8. In particular sections 8.3 and 8.4. |
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| 4 |
健康
Health
(a) 拉賈斯坦邦的健康狀況：Banerjee和Duflo (2003).
(a) Health Status in Rajasthan: Banerjee and Duflo (2003).
(b) 如果兒童沒有生病的話，他們可能會去上學。肯亞一個非政府組織進行的試驗：Miguel和Kremer (2004).
(b) Children are more likely to go to school if they are not sick. An experiment conducted by a NGO in Kenya: Miguel and Kremer (2004). |
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| 5-8 |
教育
Education
(a) 印度基礎教育調查報告 (1999).
(a) The Probe Report on Basic Education in India (1999).
印度教育機會；為什麼教育水準如此之低？家長重視教育嗎？家長能夠負擔起教育費用嗎？教育帶來的好處是什麼？
Educational choice in India: why are the levels of education so low? Do parents care about education? Can they afford it? What is education good for?
(b) 教科書真的很重要嗎？肯亞一個非政府組織進行的試驗，Glewwe和Moulin (1998)
(b) Are textbooks really important? An experiment conducted by an NGO in Kenya: Kremer, Glewwe and Moulin (1998).
(c)一個在印尼有成效的學校專案例子：Duflo (2001)
(c) An example of an effective program of school construction in Indonesia: Duflo (2001). |
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| 9 |
童工經濟學
The Economics of Child Labor
（a）為什麼童工會存在？什麼政策有助於消除這種現象？Basu和Van (1998)
(a) Why does child labor exist? What policy can help to suppress it? Basu and Van (1998).
（b）在巴西，收入對童工與入學錄取的影響：Carvalho (2000)
(b) Income Effects on Child Labor and School Enrollment in Brazil: Carvalho (2000). |
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| 10-11 |
性別歧視
Gender Discrimination
（a）印度性別歧視的證據：Dreze和Sen (1995)
(a) Evidence of gender discrimination in India: Dreze and Sen (1995).
（b）經濟原因可能導致性別歧視：Ray，第279-288頁
(b) Gender discrimination can arise due to economic reasons: Ray, pp.279-288.
（c）如何證實在日常生活中存在性別歧視？Deaton (1997)
(c) How can we prove that there is gender discrimination in everyday life? Deaton (1997).
（d）印度鄉下的消費平穩與過度的女性死亡率：Rose (1999)
(d) Consumption Smoothing and Excess Female Mortality in Rural India: Rose (1999).
(e) 「婚姻市場」：Rao (1993)
(e) The "marriage market": Rao (1993).
（f）資源不足導致「手足競爭」：Garg和Morduch (1998)
(f) Resource constraints lead to 'Sibling Rivalry': Garg and Morduch (1998). |
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| 12-13 |
家庭內的交易
Bargaining within Families
女人與男人消費的方式不一樣。來自巴西的證據（Thomas (1990)），聯合國兒童利益津貼（Lundberg, Pollak 和Wales （1996）），南非養老金計畫（Duflo （2003））。
(a) Income is not spent in the same way by women and by men: Evidence from Brazil (Thomas (1990)), the United Kingdom Child Benefit allowance (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1996)), a pension program in South Africa (Duflo (2003)).
（b）家庭內的競爭不僅限於共用資源，它也降低了家庭所有成員的生產力和福利：Udry (1996).
(b) Competition within the family is not limited to sharing the resources. It leads to lower productivity and lower welfare for all members in the family: Udry (1996). |
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| 14 |
期中考試
Midterm |
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| 15 |
儲蓄
Savings
（a）窮人會在經濟狀況好的時候，考慮為以後可能出現的拮据而儲蓄嗎？泰國稻農的儲蓄：Paxson (1992)。
(a) Do poor people save in good times in anticipation of bad times? Savings by rice farmers in Thailand: Paxson (1992).
（b）窮人能掌握儲蓄的方法嗎？墨西哥的小型儲蓄試驗：Aportela (1998)
(b) Have poor people access to savings instruments: A micro-savings experiment in Mexico: Aportela (1998). |
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| 16-17 |
土地
Land
（a）理論背景：Ray，第12章。
(a) Theoretical background: Ray, chapter 12.
（b）為什麼要土地改革？Banerjee (1999)。
(b) Why land reform? Banerjee (1999).
（c）印度的一個成功的限制性的土地改革：Banerjee和Ghatak (2002)
(c) A successful limited land reform in India: Banerjee and Ghatak (2002). |
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| 18-19 |
保險
Insurance
在一年之內，或從一年到另一年的農業收入波動都很大。消費與投資也一樣波動？還是家庭會免遭波動的影響？
Agricultural incomes fluctuate enormously during the year and from year to year. Do consumption and investments fluctuate as well, or are households protected from these fluctuations?
（a）Ray，第15章
(a) Ray, chapter 15.
（b）保險僅僅是局部的：在Cote d'Ivoire家庭成員的消費是與他們的收入相聯繫的：Deaton (1997)，第372-383頁.
(b) Insurance is only partial: the consumption of household members in Cote d'Ivoire is linked to their income: Deaton (1997), pp 372-383.
（c）在經濟困難的時期，兒童會失學並挨餓嗎？來自Cote d'Ivoire的例子：Jensen (2000)
(c) In bad times are children taken out of school, and given less to eat? An example from Cote d'Ivoire: Jensen (2000).
（d）在西非，村民相互貸款並得到某種程度的保障：Udry (1990)
(d) In West Africa, villagers lend to each other and achieve a certain degree of insurance: Udry (1990).
（e）在人煙稀少的鄉村沒有這種公共保障，這依賴於地方機構的力量：Townsend (1995)
(e) Mutual insurance in the village does not happen in the void. It depends on the strength of local institutions: Townsend (1995). |
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| 20-21 |
信用市場
Credit Markets
為什窮人不能使用正規的信貸？為什麼政府有組織的貸款不起作用？為什麼窮人會向地方高利貸借錢？
Why does formal credit fail to reach the poor? Why has targeted lending organized by the government not worked? Why do the poor borrow from local money lenders at very high rates?
（a）理論背景：Ray，第14章。
(a) Theoretical background: Ray, chapter 14.
（b）為什麼非正規的貸方把利息抬得那麼高？Aleem (1990).
(b) Why do informal money lenders charge interest rates that are so high? Aleem (1990).
（c）貸款的創新形式：小型信用：Morduch (1999)
(c) An innovative form of lending: micro-credit: Morduch (1999). |
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| 22-24 |
正規與非正規的制度
Formal and Informal Institutions
（a）社會網路
(a) Social networks
政策不會憑空出現。非正規的機構和制度標準扮演了什麼角色？
No policy happens in the void.... What role do informal institutions and norms play?
i. 標準有助於維持Maghribi商人間的遠距離貿易：Greif (1993)
i. Norms helped to sustain long distance trade among Maghribi traders: Greif (1993).
ii.然而，成功的非正規制度會成為正規制度發展的障礙：Greif (1994)
ii. However, successful informal institution can be an obstacle to the development of formal institutions: Greif (1994).
iii.社會規範對人口變遷的阻礙：Munshi (2000).
iii. Social norms as an obstacle to the demographic transition: Munshi (2000).
（b）正規的制度
(b) Formal Institutions
i.全世界的制度大不相同：La Porta和Vishny (1998)
i. Institutions differ widely around the world: La Porta and Vishny (1998).
ii. 好的制度對於經濟效益很重要：聚合的方法：Acemoglu和Robinson (2001)
ii. Good institutions are important for economic performance: aggregate approach: Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).
iii.歷史的方法：在印度，殖民歷史依然影響著今天的成果：Banerjee和Iyer (2002)，Iyer (2003)。
iii. Historical approach: In India, colonial history continues to impact today's outcomes Banerjee and Iyer (2002), Iyer (2003).
iv.制度為什麼重要。不良的制度環境可能對商業造成負面的影響。對印度的軟體市場契約和聲譽的研究：Banerjee和Duflo (2000)
iv. The mechanics of why institutions matter. A poor institutional environment may makes business difficult. A study of contracting and reputation in the Indian Software industry: Banerjee and Duflo (2000). |
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社會福利政策的阻礙：貪污
Limits to Social Policy: Corruption
（a）為什麼貪污的代價很高？Shleifer和Vishny (1993)
(a) Why is corruption costly? Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
（b）為什麼貪污不合法？為什麼貪污和瑣碎手續並存？Bnerjee (1997)
(b) Why is corruption illegal? Why does corruption and red tape go hand in hand? Banerjee (1997).
（c）貪污與社會政策的牽制：印度南部運河灌溉的例子：Wade (1982)
(c) Corruption and the diversion of social policies. The example of canal irrigation in South India: Wade (1982). |
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