MIT OpenCourseWare


» 進階搜尋
課程首頁
教學大綱
教學時程
相關閱讀資料
複習/實習課程
作業
測驗
相關資源

相關閱讀資料


The primary text for the course is Jean Tirole’s The Theory of Industrial Organization (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988). The text provides an overview of most of the theoretical topics. The text will be supplemented with a large number of recent journal articles listed below. Many of these articles are easily accessible via www.jstor.org. A reading packet contains some of the harder to find starred articles in the reading list. Some others are on reserve at Dewey library. We will also be reading several articles from R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization (New York: North Holland, 1989).

Bold readings are required.

I. Theory of the Firm

  • A. Atkinson and N. Stern, "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies 41 (1974), 119-128.
  • Tirole, Introduction and The Theory of the Firm.
  • S. Grossman and O. Hart, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (August 1986), pp. 691-796.
  • B. Holmstrom and J. Tirole, "The Theory of the Firm," in HIO.
  • O. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, 1985, Chapters 1, 3-6 (especially 1 and 3).
  • P. Joskow, "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, 77 (March 1987), pp. 168- 185.
  • G. Baker and T. Hubbard, "Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design and Information," mimeo.
  • K. Monteverde and D. Teece, "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (Spring 1982), pp. 206-213.
  • A. Shepard, "Contractual Form, Retail Pricing and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing," Rand Journal of Economics, 24 (Spring 1993), pp. 58-77.

II. Monopoly Pricing and Durable Goods

  • Tirole, Chapter 1 (including supplementary section).
  • F. Gul, H. Sonnenschein, and R. Wilson, "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory, 39 (1986), pp. 155-190.
  • D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "Upgrades, Trade-ins, and Buybacks," Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (Summer 1998), pp. 235-258.
  • G. Ellison and D. Fudenberg, "The Neo-Luddite’s Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry," Rand Journal of Economics, 31 (Summer 2000), pp. 253-272.

III. Price Discrimination

  • Tirole, Sections 3.0-3.5.
  • K. Corts, "Third Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment," Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (Summer 1998), pp. 306-323.
  • M. Perry, "Forward Integration by ALCOA: 1888-1930," Journal of Industrial Economics, 29 (September 1980), pp. 37-53.
  • R. Deneckere and R.P. McAfee, "Damaged Goods," Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5 (1996), 149-174.
  • E. Maskin and J. Riley, "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (Summer 1984), pp. 171-96.
  • R.P. McAfee, J. McMillan, and M. Whinston, "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (May 1989), pp. 371-83.
  • S. Borenstein and N. Rose, "Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry," Journal of Political Economy, 102 (August 1994), pp. 653-683.
  • A. Shepard, "Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration," Journal of Political Economy, 99 (February 1991), pp. 30-53.
  • K. Graddy, "Testing for Imperfect Competition at the Fulton Fish Market," Rand Journal of Economics, 26 (Spring 1995), pp. 75-91.

IV. Static Competition and Models of Differentiation

  • Tirole, Section 2.1 and Chapter 5.
  • F. Fisher, "Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View," Rand Journal of Economics, 20 (1989), pp. 113-124.
  • M. Baye and J. Morgan, "Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evidence," mimeo.
  • P. Klemperer, "The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs," Rand Journal of Economics, 18 (Spring 1987), pp. 138-150.
  • A. Shaked and J. Sutton, "Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, 49 (January 1982), pp. 3-14.
  • D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "Customer Poaching and Brand Switching," Rand Journal of Economics, 31 (Spring 2000), pp. 634-657.
  • D. Spector, "The Noisy Duopolist," mimeo.
  • T. Bresnahan, "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War," Journal of Industrial Economics, 35 (June 1987), 457-482.

V. Search

  • P. Diamond, "A Model of Price Adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, 3 (June 1971), pp. 156-168.
  • D. Stahl, "Oligopolistic Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumer Search," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14 (April 1996), pp. 243-268.
  • R.P. McAfee, "Multiproduct Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Journal of Economic Theory, 67 (1) (October 1995), pp. 83-105.
  • M.Baye and J. Morgan, "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets," American Economic Review, 91 (3) (June 2001), pp. 454-474.
  • A. Sorensen, "Equilibrium Price Dispersion in Retail Markets for Prescription Drugs," Journal of Political Economy, 108 (August 2000), pp. 833-850.
  • A. Sorensen, "Price Dispersion and Heterogeneous Consumer Search for Retail Prescription Drugs," mimeo.
  • G. Ellison and S.F. Ellison, "Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet," mimeo.

VI. Dynamic Competition

  • Tirole, Chapter 6.
  • J. Rotemberg and G. Saloner, "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms," American Economic Review, 76 (June 1986), 390-407.
  • E. Green and R. Porter, "Non-cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, 52 (January 1984), pp. 87-100.
  • E. Maskin and J. Tirole, "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles," Econometrica, 56 (May 1988), pp. 571-599.
  • G. Stigler, "A Theory of Oligopoly," Journal of Political Economy, 72 (February 1964), pp. 44-61.
  • C. Fershtman and A. Pakes, "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," Rand Journal of Economics, 31 (Summer 2000), pp. 207-236.
  • R. Porter, "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Economic Committee, 1880-1886," Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), pp. 301-314.
  • G. Ellison, "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," Rand Journal of Economics, 25 (Spring 1994), pp. 37-57.
  • M. Noel, "Price Cycles in Retail Gasoline Markets: A Microstudy of Firm Behavior," mimeo.
  • D. Genesove and W. Mullin, "Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case," American Economic Review, 91 (June 2001), pp. 379-398.

VII. Firm Conduct

  • R. Schmalensee, "Interindustry Studies of Structure and Performance," in HIO.
  • T. Bresnahan, "Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, " in HIO.
  • I. Domowitz, R. Hubbard and B. Petersen, "Business Cycles and the Relationship Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins, " Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (Spring 1986), 1-17.
  • T. Bresnahan, "The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identified," Economics Letters, 10, 1982, 87-92.
  • L. Lau, "On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price and Output Data," Economics Letters, 10, 1982, 93-99.
  • K. Corts, "Conduct Parameters and the Measurement of Market Power," Journal of Econometrics, (November 1998), 227-250.
  • R. Coterill, "Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from Vermont, " Review of Economics and Statistics," 68 (August 1986), 379-386.
  • A. Nevo, "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," mimeo.
  • D. Genesove and W. Mullin. "Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the Sugar Industry, 1890-1914," Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (Summer 1998), 355-377.
  • C. Wolfram, "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market," American Economic Review, 89 (September 1999), 805-826.

VIII. Empirical Models of Demand

  • A. Deaton and J. Muellbauer, Economics and Consumer Behavior, Parts 1 and 2.
  • S. Anderson, A. De Palma and J. Thisse, Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation, Chapters 2-5.
  • D. Epple, "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Estimating Demand and Supply Functions for Differentiated Products," Journal of Political Economy, 95 (February 1987), pp. 59-80.
  • R. Palmquist, "Estimating Demand for the Characteristics of Housing," Review of Economics and Statistics, 66 (August 1994), pp. 394-404.
  • S. Berry, "Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation," Rand Journal of Economics, 25 (2) (Summer 1994), pp. 242-262.
  • S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes, "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Eonometrica, 63 (July 1995), pp. 841-890.
  • A. Nevo, "A Practitioner’s Guide to Estimation of Random Coefficients Logit Models f Demand, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9 (4) (Winter 2000) pp. 513-548.
  • P. Goldberg, "Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the U.S. Automobile Industry," Econometrica, 63 (July 1995), pp. 891-952.
  • S. Ellison, I. Cockburn, Z. Griliches and J. Hausman, "Characteristics of Demand for Pharmaceutical Products: An Examination of Four Cephalosporins," Rand Journal of Economics, 28 (Autumn 1997), pp. 426-446.

IX. Entry

  • Tirole, Sections 7.1-7.2.
  • J. Sutton, Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press (1991), Chapters 1-2.
  • B. Jovanovic, "Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, (May 1982), pp. 649-670.
  • T. Bresnahan and P. Reiss, "Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 99 (October 1991), pp. 977-1009.
  • Comments on Bresnahan and Reiss, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Special Issue on Microeconomics, 3 (1987), pp. 872-882.
  • T. Dunne, M. Roberts, and L. Samuelson, "Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing," Rand Journal of Economics, 19 (Winter 1988), pp. 495-515.
  • S. Berry and J. Waldfogel, "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting," Rand Journal of Economics, 30 (Autumn 1999), pp. 397-420.
  • P. Golder and G. Tellis, "Pioneer Advantage: Marketing Logic or Marketing Legend," Journal of Marketing Research, 30 (May 1993), pp. 158-170.
  • K. Seim, "Spatial Differentiation and Firm Entry: The Video Retail Industry," mimeo.

X. Strategic Investment

  • Tirole, pp. 207-8, Chapter 8.
  • R. Schmalensee, "Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, 9 (Autumn 1978), pp. 305-327.
  • K. Judd, "Credible Spatial Preemption," Rand Journal of Economics, 16 (Summer 1985), pp. 153-166.
  • P. Aghion and P. Bolton, "Entry Prevention Through Contracts with Customers," American Economic Review, 77, June 1987, pp. 388-401.
  • J. Chevalier, "Capital Structure and Product Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry, " American Economic Review, 85 (3) (June 1995), pp. 415-435.
  • G. Ellison and S. Ellison, "Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration," mimeo.
  • Kadiyali, V., "Entry, its Deterrence, and its Accommodation: A Study of the U.S. Photographic Film Industry," The Rand Journal of Economics, 27 (Autumn 1996), pp. 452-478.
  • M. Lieberman, "Post Entry Investment and Market Structure in the Chemical Processing Industry," Rand Journal of Economics, 18 (Winter 1987), pp. 533-549.
  • R. Smiley, "Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6 (June 1988), pp. 167-180. 3.3 Social Security, Saving, and Benefit Adequacy Issues.

XI. Networks

  • J. Farrell and G. Saloner, "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," Rand Journal of Economics, 16 (1985), pp. 70-83.
  • M. Katz and C. Shapiro, "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (1986), pp. 822-841.
  • D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by the Sole Supplier of a Network Good," Journal of Industrial Economics, 48 (2000), pp. 373-390.
  • T. Bresnahan, "Network Effects and Microsoft," mimeo.
  • N. Gandal, M. Kende, and R. Rob, "The Dynamics of Technological Adoption in Hardware/Software Systems: The Case of Compact Disc Players," Rand Journal of Economics, 31 (1) (Spring 2000), pp. 43-61. (This paper will be handed out in class.)

XII. Asymmetric Information

  • Tirole, Sections 9.0-9.7.
  • J. Ordover and G. Saloner, "Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust," in HIO.
  • D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "A 'Signal-Jamming' Theory of Predation," Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (Autumn 1986), pp. 366-76.
  • P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, "Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, 50 (March 1982), pp. 443-460.
  • P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (August 1982), pp. 288-312.
  • M. Doyle and C. Snyder, "Information Sharing and Competition in the Motor Vehicle Industry," Journal of Political Economy 107 (6) (December 1999), pp. 1326-1364.
  • D. Genesove, "Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market," Journal of Political Economy, 101 (August 1993), pp. 644-665.
  • T. Hubbard, "An Empirical Examination of Moral Hazard in the Vehicle Inspection Market," The Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (Summer 1998), pp. 406-426.
  • I. Hendel and A. Lizzeri, "The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance, " mimeo.

XIII. Advertising

  • Tirole, Sections 2.2-2.4, 7.3.
  • G.S. Becker and K.M. Murphy, "A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (November 1993), pp. 941-964.
  • P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (1986), pp. 796-821.
  • D. Ackerberg, "Empirically Distinguishing Informative and Prestige Effects of Advertising," Rand Journal of Economics, 32 (Summer 2001), pp. 316-333.
  • J. Milyo and J. Waldfogel, "The Effect of Price Advertising on Prices: Evidence in the Wake of 44 Liquormart," American Economic Review, 89 (December 1999), pp. 1081-1096.

XIV. Auctions

  • P. Klemperer, "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, 13 (July 1999), pp. 227-286.
  • P. McAfee and J. McMillan, "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, (June 1987), pp. 699-738.
  • P. Milgrom, "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, (Summer 1989), pp. 3-22.
  • K. Hendricks and R. Porter, "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, (December 1988), pp. 865-83.
  • P. Bajari, "Econometrics of the First Price Auction with Asymmetric Bidders," mimeo.
  • J. Kagel, R. Harstad and D. Levin, "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, 55 (1987), pp. 1275-1304.
  • D. Lucking-Reiley, "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet," American Economic Review, 89 (December 1999), pp. 1063-1080.
  • J.-J. Laffont, H. Ossard, and Q. Vuong, "Econometrics of First Price Auctions," Econometrica, (July 1995), pp. 953-80.

XV. Patents

  • Tirole, Sections 10.1-10.5, 8.1.3.
  • M. Kremer, "Patent Buy-outs: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (November 1998), pp. 1137-1167.
  • J. Bessen and E. Maskin, "Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation," mimeo.
  • J. Green and S. Scotchmer, "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," Rand Journal of Economics, 26 (Spring 1995), pp. 131-146.
  • H. Hopenhayn and M. Mitchell, "Innovation, Variety, and Patent Breadth," Rand Journal of Economics, 32 (Spring 2001), pp. 152-166.
  • A. Pakes, "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks," Econometrica, 54 (July 1986), pp. 755-784.
  • A. Jaffe, M. Trajtenberg, and R. Henderson, "Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (August 1993), pp. 577-598.
  • J. Lerner, "Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at Finance Patents, 1971-2000," mimeo.

XVI. Diffusion of Technologies

  • G. Ellison and D. Fudenberg, "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), pp. 612-643.
  • Rogers and Shoemaker, The Diffusion of Innovations: A Cross-Cultural Approach, Free Press, 1971.
  • Z. Griliches, "Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological Change," Econometrica 25 (4) (October 1957), pp. 510-522.
  • G. Saloner and A. Shepard, "Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines," Rand Journal of Economics, 13 (Autumn 1995), pp. 479-501.


XVII. Managerial Incentives

  • Tirole, pp. 34-55.
  • B. Holmstrom, "Managerial Incentive Problems – A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies 66 (1999) pp. 169-182.
  • C. Fershtman and K. Judd, "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, 77 (December 1987), pp. 927-940.
  • R. Masson, "Executive Motivation, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance," Journal of Political Economy, 79 (December 1971), pp. 1278-1292.
  • P. Healy, "The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7 (April 1985), pp. 85-107.
  • J. Chevalier and G. Ellison, "Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (May 1999), pp. 389-432.


 
MIT Home
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Terms of Use Privacy