教學時程
Recitations for this course meet for 1 hour each Friday.
| 課 | 課程單元 | 重要日期 |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Introduction to Game Theory | |
| 2 | Payoffs in Games: Rational Choice Under Uncertainty Expected Utility Theory; Risk Aversion |
|
| 3-5 | A More Formal Introduction to Games Extensive Forms and Normal Forms Strategies, Dominant Strategies and Iterative Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies Nash Equilibrium Applications of Nash Equilibrium |
|
| 6-8 | Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection Analysis of Extensive-Form Games Backward Induction Subgame Perfection Applications Bargaining and Negotiations Forward Induction Applications |
Problem Set 1 due on Lecture 6 Problem Set 2 due two days after Lecture 8 |
| 9 | Review | |
| 10 | In Class Midterm Exam 1 | |
| 11-12 | Repeated Games and Cooperation | |
| 13-14 | Incomplete Information Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Auctions Applications |
Problem Set 3 due on Lecture 14 |
| 15-16 | Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information |
Problem Set 4 due on Lecture 16 |
| 17 | Review | |
| 18 | In Class Midterm Exam 2 | |
| 19-21 | Problems of Asymmetric Information in Economics Signaling and the Intuitive Criterion Applications of Signaling The Principal-Agent Problem Applications; Lemons, Efficiency Wages, Credit-Rationing, Price-Discrimination |
Problem Set 5 due on Lecture 21 |
| 22-23 | Global Games | |
| 24-25 | Evolutionary Foundations of Equilibrium Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Replicator Dynamics |
Problem Set 6 due on Lecture 25 |
| 26-27 | Applications and Review Final Exam |
