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This course includes lecture notes and problem sets.
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Optimal decisions of economic agents depend on expectations of other agents' actions. Subject examines various models of equilibrium, which correspond to different ways that agents might make their decisions, and various kinds of games: static games, dynamic games, and games of incomplete information.
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