導論，定義（納許均衡，完美均衡，序貫均衡，可合理化解，相關均衡解，後向歸納法，順推歸納法，序貫理性，自我鞏固均衡）
Introduction, Definitions (Nash, Perfect, Sequential Equilibrium, Rationalizability, Correlated Equilibrium, Backward Induction, Forward Induction, Sequential Rationality, Self confirming equilibria)

Fudenberg, D.和J. Tirole.章節 1，2及3
Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. Chaps. 1, 2, and 3.

Osborne, M. J.和A. Rubinstein.章節2，3，4及6
Osborne, M. J., and A. Rubinstein. Chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 6.

Aumann, R.〈後向歸納法及理性共同知識〉
Aumann, R. "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality."

Ben-Porath, E.〈完全資訊賽局中的理性，納許均衡及後向歸納法〉
Ben-Porath, E. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games."

Brandenburger, A.〈悖論的力量〉
Brandenburger, A. "The Power of Paradox".

Aumann, R.和A. Brandenburger.〈納許均衡的認識條件〉
Aumann, R., and A. Brandenburger. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium."

Bernheim, D.〈理性化的策略行為〉
Bernheim, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior."

Pearce, D.〈理性化的策略行為及完美難題〉
Pearce, D. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection."

Aumann, R.〈相關均衡解是貝葉斯理性的一種表達〉
Aumann, R. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expresssion of Bayesian Rationality."

Kreps, D.和R. Wilson.〈序貫均衡〉
Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. "Sequential Equilibria."

Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg和D. Levine.《支付函數信息及自我鞏固均衡》，研究論文。http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/papers/ack32rc.pdf
Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg, and D. Levine. Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium. Working paper. http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/papers/ack32rc.pdf

>Fudenberg, D., and D. Kreps. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium."

Osborne和Rubinstein. 章節 7，15.
Osborne and Rubinstein. Chaps. 7, 15.

Yildiz, M.〈無共同先驗的議價―― 一個快速達成共識的定理〉
Yildiz, M. "Bargaining without a common prior - An immediate agreement theorem."

Fudenberg和Tirole. 第十章
Fudenberg and Tirole. Chap. 10

Rubinstein, A.〈議價模型中的納許均衡〉
Rubinstein, A. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model."

Nash, J.〈議價問題〉
Nash, J. "The bargaining problem."

Fudenberg和Tirole. 章節 2-14.
Fudenberg and Tirole. Chaps 2-14.

Yildiz.講稿.
Yildiz. Lecture Notes.

Aumann.〈互動知識論〉
Aumann. "Interactive Epistemology."

Dekel, E.和F. Gul.〈賽局理論中的理性與認知〉，《經濟學與經濟計量學的進展：理論與應用》
Dekel, E., and F. Gul. "Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory." In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications.

Milgrom, P.和N. Stokey. 〈信息，交易與共同知識〉
Milgrom, P., and N. Stokey. "Information, Trade and Common Knowledge."

Weibull.章節2-3.
Weibull. Chap. 2-3.

Fudenberg和Levine.章節待定
Fudenberg and Levine. Chapters TBA.

Erev, I.和A. Roth.〈有限理性賽局理論的需要〉http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/
Erev, I., and A. Roth. "On the Need for Low-Rationality Game Theory." http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/

Noldeke, G.和L. Samuelson.〈順推歸納法與後向歸納法的一個演化分析〉
Noldeke, G., and L. Samuelson. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Forward and Backward Induction."

Kandori, M., G. Mailath和R. Rob.〈賽局中的學習， 轉變及長期均衡〉
Kandori, M., G. Mailath, and R. Rob. "Learning, Mutation, and Long-run Equilibria in Games."

Young, P.〈慣例的演化〉
Young, P. "The Evolution of Conventions."

Ellison, G.〈學習，局部相互作用與調和〉
Ellison, G. "Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination."

Fudenberg, D.和D. Kreps.〈擴展賽局中的學問， I： 自我鞏固均衡〉
Fudenberg, D., and D. Kreps. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibria."

Milgrom, P.和J. Roberts.〈互補性策略之賽局中的可合理化解和知識〉
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. "Rationalizability and Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities."

Milgrom, P.和J. Roberts.〈LeChatelier原理〉
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. "The LeChatelier Principle."

Vives, X.〈互補性策略的納許均衡〉
Vives, X. "Nash Equilibrium with Strategic Complementarities."

Topkis, D. M.《超模組與互補性》
Topkis, D. M. Supermodularity and Complementarity.