无需测验，考试或写文章。完全根据你如何有效地和那些诡辩的对手——你的同学进行谈判来确定你的成绩！为了得到课程成绩，学生一定要完成所有的谈判练习。每次谈判的结果将进入史隆空间网站，由助教处理和统计，以便在以后的课时里讨论。这不是一个标准的讲课。每堂课一开始就讲述本课概要。我们听取上节课的谈判汇报，讨论主要论题，然后介绍将在课上讲述的谈判架构。大部份谈判将会在课堂中进行。

本课程需要的二本课本是：

Thompson,Leigh,《谈判者的心智》，Prentice-Hall出版,第二版,2000。

Raiffa,Howard,《谈判分析的讲座》哈佛大学法学院谈判训练课程,1998。

谈判的艺术不能够与谈判的科学分离，的确，我们将强调在谈判这门行当中艺术和科学是不可或缺的伙伴。然而，有了Excel这样容易使用的软件，结合数学规划和理性地分析何谓公平，这将给我们一个机会去提升协商之舞的效率,。Raiffa's 的讲座是为了介绍“.……能帮助合作的双方获得有效和公平结果的分析。”

我们多年来对谈判者实际测试的经验正好突出了Howard所说内容的重要性。一次谈判包括许多复杂的问题，谈判者能找到双方接受的有效协议，而更多经常地，他们能达成协议。事后分析表明：事前正确准备，在谈判期间巧妙运用经过数学优化的方案，通常能达成各方更满意的成果。我将会使用这些观念评估你的表现并且综述课堂结果。因此，你应该阅读并了解Raiffa提出的主要观点。然而，你并不需要透过在计算机上计算来完成谈判练习。

Leigh Thompson的书易读且充满了关于如何谈判的有趣见解。包括很多关于如何准备的实际建议，该在谈判桌做什么以及怎样才是战略的创新。各章节的内容组织良好，内容完整。每章都有一个“外带”的段落来概括其内容。

我们将会由〈谈判与心智〉的第1章开始，作为第一课的回顾补充读物。你的第二次作业将包括〈默许的谈判和社会困境〉的第11章，作为石油价格谈判的准备。

Thompson著作的第2章为谈判的准备提供了有价值的建议。在第3、4章中包括在谈判桌上该做什么，怎样才能富有创造性，以及如何把饼作大，让每个人都能分一杯羹。当我们进行二方或多方谈判时，这些章节构成了你阅读作业的重点。谈判能力的来源将在第7章中讨论。“在谈判桌前该如何表现?”这个常见问题，在Thompson著作的第5章谈判方式的处理中会有论述。

一些谈判将会在课堂中进行，只要求你阅读指定读物作为准备。

较复杂的谈判需要你们每人扮演一个特定的角色。你将会被分派一个角色而且被预先告知这个任务, 通常这会在前一堂课让你先知道。

除了提供所有人皆可知道的一般信息，每个角色扮演者将会得到一些表述角色需求的个人信息。可以与你的谈判伙伴分享个人信息，也可以不分享。有时是由你来决定，有时却不能这样做。如果允许，你可以以口头形式与人分享个人信息。我们要求你不能直接分享那些以书面形式提供给你的信息。当我们要求你不能分享个人信息时，重荣誉的你该遵守。

除了要在网上输入你的结果，你还需要完成一个谈判后调查表。对调查表的反馈是你谈判结果的一部份。

为了让你的谈判结果算分，你一定要填写调查表。

这个调查表有两个目的：第一要鼓励你自我反省。例如，“我有多满意自己这次谈判的方式？”“如何评价谈判对手的表现?”，“对于双方来说，有什么事情是我可以作出不同选择，并且改善结果？”，“第二个目的是要让我们都对谈判中谈判者如何理解自己和对手有进一步认识——信赖，满意度等——这影响谈判的舞步和谈判结果。

每次在“真诚地”扮演一个角色，和只是为了获得一个最高的Z分数之间，你都会觉得难以平衡。多数时候，你可以遵循我们为了创造和要求价值所定下的指导方针，同时真诚地扮演我们所指派给你的角色。你肯定想要获得一个高的Z分数，同时扮演我们指派给你的角色和遵守游戏的规范。当然，这也是可以作弊的。你和你的伙伴可以同谋破坏这些规则，譬如你们可以询问之前修过这课的人他们是如何进行某项谈判的。但是，当你这样做的时候，你剥夺了你和你同伴一次宝贵的学习机会。这样的行为不仅不恰当，还是对我们信任的背叛。就像我的同事所说的一样，“这样的行为完全不适当，我们会要求你不要尝试。这样做只是减少你个人经验，对其他同学造成破坏，并严重阻碍了我们的讨论。很多时候，在筹码不高的时候谈判是很有趣的（你的表现不会被结果影响！）。我们可能会要求你给自己作更大的挑战，尝试不同的谈判方式。你或许会发现自己有尚未被发掘的潜力。

本课的副产品是你对谈判研究的贡献。你的某些谈判案例也会被研究。我们将会要求你在几次谈判练习之前或之后，完成网上的秘密调查表。这和本课程的信念相符：你所体验的许多谈判在之前课堂里的研究项目中都已经被研究过，就像你的那样。之前课程的学生对你的学习经验确有作出贡献。通过参与这个正在进行的研究，你将会对未来的学生作出贡献。这些新的练习会把学习的价值和研究的潜力最大化。我们过去做了很多满足这两个条件的练习，所以别担心做新练习。这些新课程让这门课程保持新鲜。我们的研究数据库将会以匿名的形式记录这些数据。如果不想你的谈判被收录进去，请在课后找你的老师。

你在本课程的成绩只根据你与对手谈判的表现。我们会为了评分将谈判或竞争练习分为两类：你确定一个策略以应对它同学的练习，以及在一个指定人数（1到6人）的小组中的谈判，每人选定一个角色。

Atlantis-Biovent案例是竞争环境下的例子，你提出一个策略以应付所有其他同学采用的策略。案例中，Atlantis-Biovent曾同意由Cybersettle来用计算机来仲裁，看看是否能在不通过法院解决问题。

在多目的谈判案例中，你将被指派特定角色。其中你和扮演另外角色的对手达成解决多个问题的协议。你必须在为双方创造价值和获得价值之间取得平衡。例如，你进行一个在线葡萄酒公司的销售，WineMaster.com和HomeBase.com。每方都有描述需求的机密信息 (“只让你知道!”)和各自的“底线”。这个信息含每一方在达成协议后“净收益”的一个详细描述。这类型的谈判并非仅是互相竞争，因为通过明智地交换信息，双方的地位（分数）可能得到提升。除此之外，可能有力量不对称的现象：可能一队可以轻易放弃，而另一方却很难这样做。现在设想WineMaster.com和HomeBase.com的谈判。扮演WineMaster.com的人在同样的谈判条件下进行谈判，因此，可以合理地比较那些扮演WineMaster.com谈判者的人的谈判结果。同理，也可以合理地比较扮演HomeBase.com谈判者的人的结果。问题是“当各方以不同角色，在不同谈判力量、不同评分标准的情况下进行谈判，我们如何通过合理比较来评分？”

方法是我们用“标准化”或“Z”分数来计算。它是这样运作的：假设WineMastercom解决谈判失败的最好方案所取得的平均净收益是$650K，标准差是$1200K。你身为WineMaster的谈判者，获得$750的平均净收益。你的Z分数将会是你的原始分数减掉在你在扮演角色时全部净收益的平均数$650K，再除以所有扮演该角色者所得原始分数的标准差$1200K，就是，

你的Z分数=($750- $650)/$1200=.083.

你对手HomePage.com获得净收益$1200K。所有HomePage.com的净获益平均数是$1100K，标准差是$1600K。那么你谈判对手的Z分数是

对手的Z分数=($1200- $1100)/$1600=.0625.

你的分数是.083而你对手的分数是.0625。你们都高于平均值。这些分数一方面能衡量你的谈判技能，一方面能看看你的运气和你的谈判方式与对手的方式切合而成的特定风格。

我们在课中会改变每次谈判的配对，因此，你可以认为好运和霉运是均等的。 为了防止一个十分倒霉的经历对你最终的Z分数造成太大的负面影响，我们将为每人去除两个最低的Z分数。你的最终Z分数是2次最低分以外所有分数的平均。

如果你错过一个谈判，你当次的Z分数将是-4。这是个充分的动因，确保你与对手在导师可以接受的时间进行谈判，或在规定的时间谈判。稍后谈论后勤上的其他方面。

There are no quizzes, exams or papers. Your grade depends entirely on how effectively you negotiate with sophisticated counterparts – your classmates! Students must complete all negotiation exercises in order to receive a grade for the course. Results of each negotiation are entered on a SloanSpace web site and processed by the TA for summary and discussion the following class period. This is not a standard lecture course. Each class begins with an outline of what will be covered in that class. We debrief the preceding class’s negotiation, discuss principal themes, and then present a framework for the negotiation that will unfold in the class. Most of the negotiations will take place in class.

The two required texts for this course are:

Thompson, Leigh, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator, Prentice-Hall, Second Ed., 2000.

Raiffa, Howard, Lectures on Negotiation Analysis, Program on Negotiation at the Harvard Law School, 1998.

The art cannot be separated from the science of negotiation and, indeed we shall emphasize art as an indispensable partner of science in the enterprise of negotiation. However, coupling easy to use software such as EXCEL, mathematical programming and a rational approach to reasoning about what is fair, opens a window of opportunity for improving the efficiency of the negotiation dance. Raiffa’s lectures are an introduction to, “...analysis that can help cooperative parties find efficient and equitable outcomes.”

The importance of what Howard has to say is highlighted by our experience with many years of “laboratory” testing of negotiators. In a negotiation that involves many complex issues, negotiators who do reach agreement, more often than not fail to find a jointly acceptable efficient agreement. Ex-post analysis shows that the right kind of preparation followed by skillful use of mathematical optimization during negotiation usually leads to a better outcome for all parties to the negotiation. I will use these ideas to evaluate your performance and summarize class results. You should therefore read and understand the principal ideas that Raiffa presents. However, you will not need to implement these ideas on a computer in order to complete the negotiation exercises.

Leigh Thompson’s book is easy to read and chock full of interesting insights about how to negotiate. It is full of practical advice about how to prepare, what to do at the bargaining table and how to be strategically creative. Chapters are well organized and most are self-contained. A “Take-away” paragraph summarizes each chapter's lessons.

We will begin with Chapter 1, “Negotiation, The Mind and the Heart” as retrospective reading to complement the first class. Your second assignment will include reading Chapter 11 “Tacit Negotiations and Social Dilemmas” as preparation for negotiating oil prices.

Thompson’s Chapter 2 offers valuable advice about preparation. What to do at the bargaining table and how to be creative and expand the pie for everyone are covered in Chapters 3 and 4. These chapters form the core of your reading assignments when we undertake two- and multi-party integrative negotiations. Sources of negotiating power are discussed in Chapter 7. The oft-asked question “How should I behave at the bargaining table?” is addressed in Thompson’s Chapter 5 treatment of negotiating style.

Some negotiations will take place in class and will require that you prepare by doing the assigned readings only.

More complex negotiations require that each of you play a specific role. You will be assigned to a role and informed of this assignment in advance, generally the class period before the class at which the negotiation will unfold.

In addition to providing general information that is shared by all parties, each role player will be provided with private information that describes needs and aspirations of that role player. Private information may or may not be shared with your negotiation partner(s). That is up to you in some cases and is prohibited in others. While you may verbally, when this is explicitly allowed, share private information, we ask that you do not share the written version of private information for your role provided to you. When we ask that you do not share private information, you are honor bound to do so.

In addition to entering your results on the web, you are required to complete a post negotiation questionnaire. Responses to the questionnaire are part and parcel of your negotiation results.

In order to have your negotiation results count, you must fill out the questionnaire.

This questionnaire has two purposes: the first is to encourage self-reflection. For example, “How satisfied am I with the fashion in which I conducted this negotiation?”, “How do I evaluate the performance of my negotiating counterpart?”, “What might I have done differently that would improve the outcome for me? For both parties?” The second purpose is to enhance our joint understanding of how negotiators’ perceptions of self and of counterparts — trust, satisfaction, etc.— influence the negotiation dance and negotiation outcomes.

You will feel a tension between playing a role “honestly” and simply playing to get the highest Zscore every time. Most of the time you will do as well by employing the guidelines that we develop for creating value and for claiming it while honestly acting in the spirit of the role that you are assigned. You do want to aim for a high Z-score and simultaneously stay within your role and the rules of the game. Of course, it is possible to cheat on this. You and your partner(s) can collude to break the rules or, for example, you might ask others who have taken the course earlier how they negotiated a particular exercise. But when you do, you deprive both yourself and your negotiating partner of a valuable learning experience. This type of behavior is more than inappropriate—it is a violation of trust. As a colleague says, “Such behavior is completely inappropriate and we urge you not to try it. Doing so devalues your own experience, spoils things for other students and deadens the discussion.” More often it is fun to negotiate in a setting where the stakes are not high (your job doesn’t depend on the outcome!). We may ask you to “Stretch yourself” and experiment with different negotiation styles. You may discover that you have untapped potential.

A byproduct of this course is your contribution to negotiation research. Some of your negotiation cases will double as research investigations. You will be asked to complete web based confidential questionnaires before and/or after several of your negotiation exercises. This fits the philosophy of the course: Many of the negotiations you will experience have been studied in previous research projects in former classes, like yours. Students from those classes have contributed to your learning experience. By participating in this ongoing research, you enhance what future students learn. These new exercises will be designed to maximize both learning value and research potential. We have lots of practice satisfying both criteria, so don't worry about experiencing new exercises. They help keep the course fresh.Outcomes are recorded anonymously in our research database. If you do not want outcomes of your negotiations to be included, please approach your instructor after class.

Your grade in this course depends exclusively on how well you negotiate with your counterparts.We shall distinguish two types of negotiations or competitive exercises for scoring: exercises in which you decide on a strategy to be played against all other members of the class and negotiations among a prescribed small number (one to six) of individuals, each chosen to play a specific role.

The Atlantis-Biovent case is an example of a competitive situation in which you will submit a strategy that will be played against strategies adopted by all other members of the class. In this case,Atlantis and Biovent have agreed to submit to a computer based mediation service offered by Cybersettle to see if they can settle without going to court.

You will be assigned specific roles to play in mixed motive bargaining cases. A mixed motive bargain is one in which you and your counterparts in other roles aim at an agreement that resolves more than one, possibly many, issues. You must manage the tension between creating value for both parties and claiming value. For example, you will undertake the sale of an on-line wine company,WineMaster.com to HomeBase.com. Each side possesses confidential information (“For your eyes only!”) that lays out aspirations and a “bottom line.” This information includes a detailed statement of the “net gain” that each party receives upon reaching agreement. Negotiations of this type are not strictly competitive because by judicious exchange of information both parties may improve their position (score). In addition, there may be asymmetries of power: it may be easy for one party to walk away and hard for the other to do so. Now suppose that WineMaster.com and HomeBase.com negotiate. All of you playing the role of WineMaster.com are negotiating under identical negotiation conditions, so it is reasonable to compare outcomes of negotiations of those who play the role of a WineMaster.com’s negotiator. Reasoning similarly, it is reasonable to compare outcomes of all who play the role of HomeBase.com’s negotiator. The question is “How do we arrive at a score that allows reasonable comparisons among parties playing different roles with different bargaining power and different scoring scales?”

The answer is to compute what we shall call a “normalized” or “Z-“ score. Here is how it works.Suppose that the average net gain above WineMaster.com’s best alternative to no agreement is found to be $650K with a standard deviation of $1200K. You, as a WineMaster negotiator, have achieved a net gain of $750K. Your Z-score is your raw score minus the average of all net gains in your role, $650K,divided by the standard deviation of raw scores achieved by all who played your role, $1200K, or

ZYOU = ($750 - $650) / $1200 = .083.

Your counterpart at HomePage.com achieved a net gain of $1200K. The average of all HomePage.com net gains is $1100K with standard deviation $1600K. Then the Z-score for your negotiating counterpart is

ZCOUNTERPART = ($1200 - $1100) / $1600 = .0625.

You received a recorded score of .083 and your counterpart receives a recorded score of .0625. Both of you scored higher than the mean. These scores are, in part, a measure of your negotiating skill and in part a measure of luck and the particular fashion in which your negotiating style meshed with that of your negotiating partner.

We will change match-ups for each negotiation during the course, so you may expect your good luck and bad luck to average out. To prevent a really unlucky experience from having too large a negative impact on your final average Z-score, we shall drop the worst two Z-scores for each individual. Your final Z-score will be an average of all but the two worst Z-scores that you achieve.

If you miss a negotiation, you will receive -4 as a Z-score. This is ample incentive to make sure that you either agree to negotiate with your counterparts at a time acceptable to the instructors or do the negotiation when assigned. More on the logistics of this later.