总览
人不会在真空的环境下做出决定。我们做出的选择会影响到他人，同样，别人的选择也会影响到我们。当环境变化不定时，这种情况被称为〈博弈〉和博弈参与，是一件严肃的事情。经理人常常要参与博弈决策，其对手即有公司内别的部门、他的下属等等，也有公司外的竞争者、客户、政府机构甚至是资本市场！本门课程的目标是加强学员在复杂的，互相影响的环境中战略思考的能力。博弈论的知识会让你在这样的战略环境中占有优势。
本课程围绕3个〈在博弈中获得优势的主题〉安排：
- 承诺/战略迁移： 可信性、威胁和承诺：改变博弈的方法
- 发掘隐藏的信息：什么时候披露信息或不披露信息，包括何时让对手大吃一惊。把不利的选择作为一种战略影响。
- 有限合理性：在对手不是充分理性的情况下如何博弈，在对手不确定你的 理性程度时如何博弈。
在商业战略上的特殊事件会充当激励因素，但本课并不是一门关于商业战术的课程。例如，通过此课你不一定会称为更好的贸易商或是更好的谈判者。本课的目标是使你能在有多种可能性的战略情况中对重要事件有更深的理解能力。
作为经济学的核心课程，博弈论在史隆学院的其他多门课程中被广泛引用：竞争公司间的博弈，课程15.013（战略决定的产业经济学）；公司和供应商间的博弈，经理人和雇员间的博弈，课程15.903（公司战略和广义企业）；此外还有在谈判，国际宏观经济学，公司财务等课程中的应用。半个学期的学习时间对于学习博弈论在任何一个领域的特定应用的一小部分也是绝对不够的。更恰当的说，本课的目标是让学生对互相影响的战略环境有个更深刻的直觉和思考的框架。本课是为补充史隆学院其他经济学和战略课程而设置的，是一门独立的课程。核心经济学15.010不是此可的先修课程。
我的意见是：对博弈论的重要意义的最好掌握并不在于一些抽象的理论层面，而是要通过那些真实的例子来掌握。正因为次，我们将会讨论许多真实的案例分析在商业环境中的博弈。的确，此门课程的一个重要因素是一个团队项目，在其中学生们将确定真实的博弈中的利益，用课程中的方法分析利益，并给博弈的参与者提供具体的战略意见。
所以，我的目标是教授博弈理论而不是数学。实际上，学生们会发现一个有趣的似非而是的观点：数学透明度越高，博弈就越有趣越有挑战性。例如：在课程15.010中，我们通过导出反应曲线等其他工具，系统地研究了求过于供市场博弈中的平衡，但仅在表层－通过数学方法来研究的层面是没有真正的趣味性的。当然，我们会用到反应曲线和类似工具，但最终得出与数学无关的理论。所以，有人问你一个简单的与等式和曲线没有任何关系的问题（例如问题〈我们是否要购买一个降低成本的创新，这个创新会最也会终降我们竞争对手的成本〉），你就会对相关重要的战略性事件有一个迅速的理解。
阅读
课程的课文有：
Dixit, Avinash K.和 Susan Skeath，《博弈理论》，纽约，NY: W. W. Norton & Companyy, 1999。ISBN: 0393974219。
要求有课程浏览
学分：
学分将取决于3个小组作业（一个〈问题提出〉，一个〈战略备忘录〉和一个〈实际应用〉），博弈参与（包括网上和课上的博弈）和期末考试。
| 问题提出 |
15% |
| 战略备忘录 |
15% |
| 实际应用 |
25% |
| 博弈参与 |
20% |
| 期末考试 |
25% |
|
Overview
People rarely make decisions in a vacuum. The choices we make affect others, and their choices impact us. Such situations are known as "games" and game-playing, while sounding whimsical, is serious business. Managers frequently play "games" both within the firm with other divisions and subordinates, etc. as well as outside the firm with competitors, customers, regulators, and even capital markets! The goal of this course is to enhance your ability to think strategically in complex, interactive environments. Knowledge of game theory will give you an advantage in such strategic settings.
The course is structured around three "themes for acquiring advantage in games":
- Commitment / Strategic Moves: Credibility, threats, and promises as ways to change the game being played.
- Exploiting Hidden Information: When to reveal information or not, including when to surprise an opponent. Adverse selection as a strategic force.
- Limited Rationality: How to play when others may not be fully rational, and when others are uncertain about your rationality.
Specific issues that arise in business strategy will act as motivation, but this is not a course about business tactics. For instance, you will not necessarily become a better trader or a better negotiator. Rather the goal is to provide you with a deeper understanding of key issues that arise in a wide variety of strategic situations.
As a core discipline of economics, game theory is applied in many other courses offered at Sloan. These applications are wide-ranging: games played between competing firms in 15.013 (Industrial Economics for Strategic Decisions); games played between firms and their suppliers and between managers and their employees in 15.903 (Corporate Strategy and Extended Enterprises); not to mention applications in negotiations, international macroeconomics, corporate finance, etc… A half-semester could never suffice to study even a fraction of these particular applications in any depth. Rather this course is designed to provide students with deeper intuitions and a framework for thinking about interactive strategic settings. While the course is designed to complement Sloan's other economics and strategy offerings, it is self-contained. There are no prerequisites beyond the Core economics course 15.010.
My view is that the important ideas of game theory are best mastered not at the level of some abstract theory but through the flesh and blood of real examples. For this reason, we will discuss numerous real-world examples and analyze games that arise in business settings. Indeed, an important element of the course is a team project in which students will identify a real-world game of interest, analyze it using the tools of the course, and offer concrete strategic advice to some player in the game.
In the same spirit, my goal is to teach game theory, not mathematics. Actually, students will discover a fascinating paradox: the more transparent the mathematics, the more interesting and challenging the issues that can arise. For example, in 15.010 we spent our time methodically calculating equilibrium in the Cournot oligopoly game by deriving reaction curves and so on, but there was nothing truly interesting at the superficial – though mathematical – level of that treatment. We will of course use reaction curves and such as tools but only ultimately to get to ideas that are mathematics-free. So when someone asks you a simple question without all of the equations and curves (say "Should we pursue a cost-reducing innovation that will ultimately lower both our costs and our competitors?") you will have a ready understanding of the key strategic issues involved.
Readings
The text for this course is:
Dixit, Avinash K., and Susan Skeath. Games of Strategy. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999. ISBN: 0393974219.
A course reader will also be required.
Grades
Grades will depend on three team assignments (one "problem set", one "strategy memo", and one "real-world application"), games participation (including online and in-class games), and a final exam.
| Problem Set |
15% |
| Strategy Memo |
15% |
| Real-World Application |
25% |
| Games Participation |
20% |
| Final Exam |
25% |
|
